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Hard Cases and
the Politics of
Righteousness
BY CARL E. SCHNEIDER
And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye,
but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? . . .
Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye;
and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy
brother’s eye.
—MATTHEW 7:3-5

T

he law of bioethics has been the law of cases. Interpreting the common law and the Constitution,
judges have written the law of informed consent,
abortion, and assisted suicide. Reacting to causes célèbres, legislatures have written the law of advance directives and end of
life decisions. The long, sad death of Terri Schiavo eclipsed
even the long, sad deaths of Karen Ann Quinlan and Nancy
Beth Cruzan in the duration and strength of the attention
and passions it evoked. What are Schiavo’s lessons?
Hard cases, lawyers say, make bad law. Why? First, hard
cases are atypical cases. They present abnormal situations that
normal rules do not anticipate and cannot handle. Schiavo is
egregiously atypical. Persistent vegetative states are unusual.
Few families fight so implacably and repellently. Courts—
and even less legislatures, governors, and presidents—rarely
encounter cases about withdrawing treatments. Decisions
usually take days, not decades.
Second, hard cases make bad law because hard cases force
tragic choices—choices where walking toward one blessing
means walking away from another. The interests of the Schiavos and the Schindlers were irreconcilable. Ms. Schiavo’s interests in living and dying clashed.
The menace of hard cases is that they invite response. But
no rule can resolve tragic conflicts well. Even could such a
rule be imagined, the law that can manage the hard case mishandles ordinary ones. Thus the best response to hard cases is
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usually no response. No system of rules ever produces uniformly good results; the goal of legislation is therefore to devise the system that yields the fewest bad results. The course
of wisdom is to learn when bad results must be tolerated.
But who thinks Schiavo a hard case? It has primarily provoked righteous vindication: Had you but listened to me, all
would be well. The conventional bioethical and medical wisdom is that the internecine strife that ignited Schiavo would
have been extinguished had Ms. Schiavo done her duty and
prepared an advance directive. This is a triumph of faith over
reason: First, as Rebecca Dresser has noted, a court long ago
granted Mr. Schiavo the authority to act for his wife. Second,
early on a court found “clear and convincing evidence” that
Ms. Schiavo would have wanted to forego food and water in
her circumstances. Both rulings did what advance directives
would presumably have done, but neither ended her travail.
But suppose Ms. Schiavo had—despite her youth—written a living will. Suppose—heroically—that it accurately and
lucidly described a careful decision to refuse food and water
in a persistent vegetative state. The Schindlers would still
have presented medical evidence that Ms. Schiavo was not in
that condition. For that matter, bitter and obdurate litigants
don’t need a good case to protract litigation endlessly.
Indeed, as Ms. Schiavo’s guardian ad litem notes in this
issue, the Schindlers “stated that even if Theresa had executed a formal, written living will, they would have fought to
have it voided because they did not believe it was consistent
with their and her beliefs.” And they would have had a point.
Living wills call for greater powers to predict circumstances
and preferences than most of us can muster. Ms. Schiavo
would not only have had to imagine the unimaginable about
her physical circumstances, she would also have had to anticipate the ways her social circumstances would affect her medical choices. For instance, had Ms. Schiavo anticipated her
parents’ inconsolable distress at her death, would she have
been willing to perdure?
Far from demonstrating the merit of living wills, Schiavo
demonstrates their danger. We are insistently admonished
that our wishes will be followed if we make living wills. How?
Often, just by signing a form from the internet. But many of
us cannot actually read those forms. Few of us understand
what medical and social decisions they embody. Most of us
sign the form as is, without alterations. Evidently one size fits
all. Had Ms. Schiavo signed such a document in such a way,
what would it be worth? Do life and death turn on such “evidence”?
But the complacent righteousness of the conventional wisdom is as nothing compared with the outraged righteousness
of, for want of better terms, the political left and right. The
excesses of the harder right have been much remarked and
much reviled. And certainly some harder rightists speak with
unfortunate carelessness, unattractive confidence, and unwholesome belligerence.
But the righteousness of the right has already been deplored lavishly enough. I want to discuss a less noticed reaction, one that says much about how we make bioethical polMay- June 2005

icy. The left leapt to dismiss the right as vicious and self-interested: Right-to-life organizations could only be speaking
about Ms. Schiavo because they wanted to score points in the
abortion debate; Republican politicians could only be voting
to win re-election. Quite respectable people deploy quite extravagant terms. The New Republic lamented that “[a]ll the
sagacious boundaries were smashed. The machinery of government was twisted to the uses of an ideology and a family.”
The President “besmirched his oath of office.” An op-ed
piece in the Los Angeles Times announced that “some social
conservatives are happy to see the federal government acquire
Stalinist proportions when imposing their morality on the
rest of the country.”
I got my own taste of this reflexive scorn from one academic I met recently. I mentioned that flu had sentenced me to
hours of Schiavo television. Certain I would share his political opinions, my interlocutor made some scoffing remarks
about Republicans in Congress. I said he seemed quite contemptuous of his fellow citizens. He seemed startled that I
could think of Republicans as fellow citizens: “Sometimes
contempt is the only response . . . .” Republicans were not
only self-interested and vicious, they were hypocritical. Their
ideas were best explained in sociological, not intellectual,
terms. Modernity had passed these poor people by, and their
status anxiety led them to cling to laughable religious and social delusions.
I describe this conversation because it exemplifies common attitudes in consequential parts of American society.
Consider academia. The range of political views in much of
academia—not least in bioethical quarters—is so straitened
that it virtually excludes much of ordinary American political
May- June 2005

opinion. The politics of righteousness has many roots. But
one reason so many academics generally and bioethicists particularly embrace it—even relish it—is that they have so few
professional opportunities to get to know and understand
people who see the world differently from them. Why does
diversity find its limits at diversity of opinion?
Left and right meet, then, in the politics of the righteousness. Both preach the gospel of rights. Neither brooks any
compromise of the right it favors. Each thinks the other perfidious and two-faced. Neither can imagine learning from
the other. And when the politics of righteousness meet a hard
case like Schiavo, mutual contumely and improvident policy
are the wretched issue.

!

!

!

W

hat would it take to produce wiser policy? Could
we treat our fellow citizens as we wish to be treated? First, could we abjure accusations of
hypocrisy? Hypocrisy is hard to judge: You cannot fairly determine whether a person’s positions contradict his beliefs
unless you genuinely understand those beliefs, something the
politics of righteousness hardly rewards. And accusations of
hypocrisy in politics often mean “you are abandoning your
views and agreeing with me.” A strange criticism.
Second, might some of our opponents sometimes be right
in some things? “I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think
it possible you may be mistaken.” Could we listen to our opponents’ most reasonable leaders, look for their most
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT
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thoughtful positions, and enter sympathetically into their
minds? Might a decent regard for the people with whom we
share a nation and the certainty of our own fallibility lead us
to embrace compromise when compromise is possible?
What if we thus approached the Schindlers’ sympathizers?
I think they are partly reacting to a large but dimly perceived
change in legal and social views about when human life is
worth protecting. In particular, the law about how we treat
life at its two ends has been transformed in the last few
decades.
That transformation is most
obvious at the beginning of life.
Some thirty years ago, abortion
was generally illegal. Today, it is
a right. Similarly, law at the end
of life has shifted quickly and
broadly. Fifty years ago, halting
medical treatment was suspect.
Now treatment is routinely
abandoned, the distinction between declining and withdrawing treatment is moribund, nutrition and hydration have become “medical treatments,” and
assisted suicide has been mooted
as a constitutional right, seriously contemplated in several states,
and permitted in one. Finally,
we recently adopted a new definition of death. Perhaps any
new definition of death would
be unsettling, but the new definition was introduced for instrumental reasons, including
making organ donation easier,
which may increase disquiet.
The transformation is not
just in practice; it is in the
thinking that underlies it. In
Cruzan, for example, the
Supreme Court came within
one vote of holding that incompetent patients have a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Since incompetent people cannot make their own medical decisions, the
dissenters were arguing that surrogates have a constitutional
right to refuse treatment for patients. The dissenters thought
states could not constitutionally require surrogates to meet a
“clear and convincing” evidence standard in making such decisions. Since patients’ preferences are often undiscoverable,
the dissenters were effectively freeing surrogates to decide for
themselves whether patients should live. It takes a keen eye to
detect the difference between this and involuntary euthanasia, the traditional bottom of the slippery slope.

The dissents in Cruzan hint at another argument that surfaces regularly in discussions of Schiavo—that these decisions
should be made by the family, apparently without governmental interference. This view extends the argument frequently made about abortion—that it is a “private decision”
in which the state may not “impose” its moral preferences. In
the abortion context, that argument assumes that the fetus
lacks the moral status of a person “in the whole sense” (as the
Court put it in Roe v. Wade). But to suppose that the state has
no legitimate interest in supervising decisions to end people’s
lives is, in our legal tradition, astonishing.
These are large changes in
how we regard and cherish
human life. They are large
changes in when and how life
may be protected. The changes
may well be desirable. They may
also be inevitable. But they are
consequential enough that they
should be scrupulously evaluated. If only because the changes
are so recent—and continuing?—that evaluation has yet to
occur. This may legitimately
concern the Schindlers’ sympathizers.

If we hear the Schindlers’
supporters in a generous
spirit, we perceive that
understandings about the
ways we value human life
have changed rapidly
and deeply, that this
transformation has not
received satisfactorily broad
and probing attention, and
that it is reasonable to ask
whether the changes have
taken us where we truly
want to go.

26

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

!

!

!

T

he way the transformation has been accomplished may exacerbate
the anxiety the Schindlers’ supporters express. First, some of it
occurred outside most people’s
sight. The revolution in abortion law was certainly hard to
miss, but the new definition of
death and the new practices at
the end of life have been largely
managed by experts outside
public view. New practices
evolved as doctors and patients made decisions and as courts
intermittently joined in. Schiavo may have stimulated so
much indignation in part because many people had no idea
things had gone so far.
Second, the changes have often escaped productive social
discussion. It is not enough that people know about large social and legal developments. Such changes should also be the
subject of genuine social debate, debate that accommodates
the whole range of opinion and that can actually affect law
and social practice. Some of the changes I have described,
however, have occurred in forums that make such debate imMay- June 2005

possible. For example, referenda and legislation have been
the occasion for fruitful conversation about assisted suicide.
But much more change has unfortunately been driven by
constitutional litigation.
Two problems with constitutional litigation as the engine
of change are relevant to Schiavo. First, constitutional litigation narrows the scope of debate to fit the awkward and artificial categories of due-process analysis. Legal logic supplants
moral reasoning. Rules must fit the authority of the court,
not the needs of the problem. Second, constitutional litigation is inimical to democratic discourse. It takes issues away
from citizens and confides them to judges, lawyers, and a few
clients.
Roe v. Wade (perhaps the epicenter of the politics of righteousness) illustrates these problems disturbingly well. In the
late 1950s, abortion laws began to be re-examined. Between
1967 and 1971, seventeen states amended their abortion
laws. California’s statute effectively and New York’s statute
expressly made abortion widely available. But just as the democratic process was working thoughtfully and usefully, the
Court decided Roe and arrogated the issue to itself.
As an exercise in moral inquiry or legal analysis, the
Court’s opinion has few defenders. In it, ipse dixit supplants
reasoning: “[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory
of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman.” Why not? The state has an “important and legitimate interest in potential life,” but that interest does not
override the mother’s rights until the fetus is viable. Why
not? “We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins.” Why not? Roe may establish a good system for regulating abortion, but such deficient reasoning about human
life should not be its basis.
As an exercise in politics, Roe was ill considered and inept.
Political institutions were working toward a compromise on
abortion without inciting the political fury that Roe has afflicted us with. That fury, I think, comes partly from the substance of what the Court did, but also from the way it suppressed the processes of democracy. As Judge Calabresi
wrote, “The Court, when it said that fetuses are not persons
for purposes of due process, said to a large and politically active group: ‘Your metaphysics are not part of our Constitution.’” The Court told them “they could not be true Americans so long as they held to their beliefs. This was catastrophic because it reinforced doubts which the holders of
anti-abortion beliefs already had about their full acceptance
in American society.” All this helps explain some of the attacks on courts that, on my reading of the Schiavo litigation,
seem so misplaced.
Happily, the Supreme Court may have learned from its
chastening experience with Roe. In Glucksberg v. Washington,
the Supreme Court declined to create a constitutional right
to the assistance of a physician in committing suicide exactly
because Americans were “engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide.” The Court stayed its hand to
May- June 2005

“permit this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society.”7
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have been arguing that if we hear the Schindlers’ supporters in the generous spirit I have urged, we perceive
that understandings about the ways we value human life
have changed rapidly and deeply, that this transformation
has not received satisfactorily broad and probing attention,
and that it is reasonable to ask whether the changes have
taken us where we truly want to go. It is especially reasonable
if you share the views about human life that animate many
opponents of abortion.
As Rebecca Dresser argues, the failure of the living will
and the limits of surrogate judgment now compel us to consider whether we can give useful meaning to a “best interests”
test for those incompetent patients for whom no one speaks.
Because the law of bioethics is the law of cases, any progress
we make is likely to grow out of disputes. In resolving them,
as in “nearly all the important transactions of life,” wrote
James Fitzjames Stephen, “we have to take a leap in the dark.
. . . [W]e have to act for the best, and in nearly every case
to act upon very imperfect evidence.” We will accomplish
this task best if we renounce the politics of righteousness.
I began by saying that hard cases are misleading. Not
least, they distract us from graver but grayer issues. Our
health system has many problems more pressing than making decisions for incompetent patients. For example, many
more people are tormented by the notorious and scandalous
undertreatment of pain in American medicine. In one large
study of seriously ill patients, half “complained of pain and
one sixth reported extremely severe pain of any frequency or
moderately severe pain occurring at least half of the time.”
The undertreatment of pain afflicts millions and millions
more dying patients—and chronically ill patients—than improvident decisions for incompetent patients. Must we await
another hard case to address it?
Gaudy hard cases are misleading in another way. One of
Schiavo’s curses is that it seems to teach us that decisions for
incompetent patients are routinely bungled. However, the
evidence, while spotty and shallow, suggests that this is false,
at least for dying patients. Decisions ordinarily seem to be
made as a consensus grows among the physicians and the
family that further treatment is bootless. This process is not
usually prolonged nor unduly disputatious. We cannot know
whether the decisions are “right,” but they are normally
made the way most patients want—thoughtfully and by people who love them.
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